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1Abstract
Within the context of strategic interaction, we provide a uniﬁed
framework for analyzing information, knowledge, and the “sta-
ble” pattern of behavior. We ﬁrst study the related interactive
epistemology and, in particular, show an equivalence theorem
between a strictly dominated strategy and a never-best reply in
terms of epistemic states. We then explore epistemic foundations
behind the fascinating idea of stability due to J. von Neumann
and O. Morgenstern. The major features of our approach are: (i)
unlike the ad hoc semantic model of knowledge, the state space
is constructed by Harsanyi’s types that are explicitly formulated
by Epstein and Wang (Econometrica 64, 1996, 1343-1373); (ii)
players may have general preferences, including subjective ex-
pected utility and non-expected utility; and (iii) players may be
boundedly rational and have non-partitional information struc-
tures. JEL Classiﬁcation: C70, C72, D81.
Keywords: epistemic games; Harsanyi’s types; interactive epis-
temology; stability; non-expected utility; bounded rationality
21 Introduction
In their classics, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) enthusiastically advo-
cated the idea of “stability” by introducing a fascinating solution concept of
the vN-M stable set. Ever since then the criterion of stability has been widely
applied in economics and other social sciences; see, for instance, Lucas (1994)
and Shubik (1982) for surveys. Greenberg (1990) took this line of approach
one step further by providing an integrated approach to the study of formal
models in the social and behavioral sciences. Chwe (1994), Greenberg et al.
(1996, 2002), Luo (2001), Nakanishi (1999), and Xue (1998) are some examples
of recent applications in game theory and economic theory.
While most applications have concentrated on cooperative environments,
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, Sections 4.6, 4.7, and 65.1) also referred
to the idea of stability as the “accepted standard of behavior” in a fairly wide
range of social organizations. Recall that a vN-M (abstract) stable set is deﬁned
as a subset K of ordered outcomes satisfying the following two conditions:
(1) [internal stability] no y in K is dominated by an x in K;
(2) [external stability] every y not in K is dominated by some x in K.
Accordingly, the stability criterion is fully characterized by a pair of principles:
internal stability and external stability.
Within the conventional semantic framework, Luo (2002) ﬁrst explored mi-
crofoundations behind the “stable” pattern of behavior. The rationale behind
stability was found to be surprisingly abundant by establishing the formal epis-
temic linkage between stability and Bayesian rationality. Among others, Luo
(2002) proved that (i) common knowledge of rationality (c.k.r.) implies an ex-
ternally stable set that, in turn, is contained in an internally stable set; and
(ii) whenever choice sets are mutually known, rationality alone implies a stable
set. A major objective of this paper is to further extend this line of research
by allowing for rather general information structures and diverse preferences.
In particular, we are interested here in seeking epistemic conditions on the
set-valued solution concept in extremely general situations.
3In this paper we adopt a decision-theoretic approach to game theory, as
suggested ﬁrst by Harsanyi (1967-1968) and further developed later by Tan
and Werlang (1988), in which each player’s problem of choosing a strategy
is cast as a single agent decision problem under uncertainty. By employing
Epstein and Wang’s (1996) general construction of Harsanyi’s types (cf. also
Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) for construc-
tions of types in the Bayesian framework), we provide a uniﬁed framework for
analyzing information, knowledge, and the “stable” pattern of behavior. More
speciﬁcally, we provide an analytical framework in which the state space rep-
resents the exhaustive uncertainty facing each player in a strategic setting –
i.e., the primitive uncertainty about the choices of strategy by all players, as
well as the uncertainty about all players’ types (each type is homeomorphic to
an inﬁnite regress of a hierarchy of “preferences over preferences”). This paper
is thereby closely related to Epstein’s (1997) work on the study of rationaliz-
ability and equilibrium by considerably relaxing the deﬁnition of rationality. As
emphasized above, this paper focuses on the epistemic analysis of the solution
concept of the stable set.
There are three primary reasons for pursuing the study of this paper. Firstly,
experimental evidence such as the Ellsberg Paradox contradicts some of the
tenets in the Savage model; for example, the Sure-Thing Principle. In particu-
lar, decision makers usually display an aversion to uncertainty or ambiguity (see
Epstein (2000) for a market counterpart of the Ellsberg Paradox). Under the
presumption that uncertainty is important in strategic settings, concern with
descriptive accuracy, it is hence a signiﬁcant research subject to study games
where players might have general preferences, including subjective expected
utility and non-expected utility; see, e.g., Dow and Werlang (1994), Epstein
(1997), Ghirardato and Le Breton (2000), Klibanoﬀ (1993, 1996), Lo (1996,
1999), Luo and Ma (2001), and Marinacci (2000). In the same vein, this paper
investigates epistemic foundations behind the set-valued solution concept of the
stable set in games where players might exhibit general preferences.
Secondly, much of the work on the epistemic foundations of game-theoretic
solution concepts has been done within the ad hoc semantic framework (see,
e.g., Aumann (1976, 1987, 1995, 1999), Aumann and Brandenburger (1995),
4and Brandenburger and Dekel (1987)), in which the information structure is
assumed to be partitional. However, weakening the assumptions on information
is clearly appealing since the assumption of a partitional information structure
is rather restrictive in many economic applications (see, e.g., Bacharach (1985),
Dekel and Gul (1997), Geanakoplos (1989, 1994), Luo and Ma (2003), Morris
(1996), Rubinstein (1998), Samet (1990), and Shin (1993) for discussions; in
particular, Brandenburger at al.’s (1992) work on correlated equilibrium with
generalized information structures). By making use of Epstein and Wang’s
(1996) general construction of types, the proposed framework in this paper
allows players to be boundedly rational and have a non-partitional informa-
tion structure (see Rubinstein 1998, Chapter 3); for example, players may be
“unaware of awareness,” “ignoring ignorance,” or even convinced of something
objectively incorrect – i.e., they might fail to satisfy the basic axioms of knowl-
edge: the axiom of knowledge, the axiom of transparency,a n dthe axiom of
wisdom.
Thirdly, there is a well-known philosophical diﬃculty with the conventional
semantic framework used in game theory. The diﬃculty is that the notion of a
state of the world, or simply a state, may be self-referential since it consists of
as p e c i ﬁcation of information, knowledge, and strategy.1 Within the proposed
framework in this paper, as a type associated with a state is explicitly con-
structed from hierarchies of preferences over the constructed state space, the
comprehensive representation of a state allows for eliciting, as not being ad hoc,
all aspects of the full description of the world, including information, knowl-
edge, preferences, and the choice of strategy. Our approach, equipped with a
rich state space, therefore is immunized from this self-referential criticism. At
a conceptual level, our approach is also signiﬁcant, because within the frame-
work in this paper, the assumption that the model of knowledge is commonly
1See, e.g., Aumann (1999, p. 264) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, p. 77). As
Fagin et al. (1999, p. 332) articulated: “The problem is that it is not ap r i o r iclear
what the relation is between a state in an Aumann structure – which is, after all, just an
element of a set – and the rather complicated reality that this state is trying to model.
...... This seems to lead to circularity, since the partitions are deﬁned over the states, but
the states contain a description of the partitions. One particularly troubling issue, already
mentioned in Aumann’s original paper, is how the states can be used to capture knowledge
about the model itself, such as the fact that the partitions are common knowledge.”
5known can be stated formally (see 4.1), whereas this sort of assumption must
be understood informally in a meta-sense. Moreover, the proposed framework
oﬀers a thorough set-up for thinking about the set-valued game-theoretic solu-
tion concepts, like the vN-M stable set; it suggests a novel interpretation for
the “choice set” associated with a state (see 4.2).
To conclude this introduction, we provide a perspective on the main results
of this paper. As a state constructed by Harsanyi’s notion of a type can be
viewed as the counterpart in the conventional semantic framework, we start (in
Subsection 2.3) by investigating the relationship between two diﬀerent deﬁn-
itions of knowledge. To be sure, while Aumann (1976) and much work that
followed deﬁned “knowledge” in terms of an exogenous information structure,
the notion of knowledge used in this paper is deﬁned endogenously as a property
of preferences over acts – roughly speaking, a known event’s complement is
required to be null in the sense of Savage. It is shown that the notion of knowl-
edge elicited from (state-type-)preferences is consistent with the one deﬁned in
a semantic fashion (see K5 in Lemma 1). This relationship allows us to exploit
the relative familiar and simple semantic way of analysis whenever doing so
is more convenient. It is noteworthy to mention that, along the line of Sav-
age’s (1954) choice-theoretic approach, Morris (1996, 1997) oﬀered a “similar”
framework in which the notions of information and knowledge can be deduced
from exogenously speciﬁed preferences at a state. As a by-product, we extend
Morris’ (1996) results on properties of knowledge to an inﬁnite state space (see
K1-5 in Lemma 1).
We next relate the notion of “payoﬀ dominance” in games to the notion of
“never-best response” in terms of epistemic states by establishing an equiva-
lence theorem (Theorem 1). As the former one is used to deﬁn et h es t a b l es e t
(see Deﬁnition 1) on the one hand and the latter one is referred to epistemic
rationality on the other hand, the equivalence theorem will play a “bridging”
role to link stability with rationality. The main argument for the equivalence
theorem is using Glicksberg’s Fixed Point Theorem.
We lastly turn to the study of the epistemic foundation for a stable set within
the proposed framework in this paper. In order to deal with a set-valued so-
lution concept, we deﬁne the notion of “rationality” by requiring that, in face
6of epistemic uncertainty, the set of plausible strategy choices consist of all the
best replies (see Subsection 2.4). Under rather mild conditions, it is shown that
rationality as well as c.k.r. prescribe the “stable” pattern of strategy behavior
that coincides with iterated strict dominance (Theorem 2). If, in particular,
the set of strategy choices is publicly known as a “social norm,” rationality co-
incides with stability (see (3.2) in Theorem 3). The basic logic for these results
runs as follows: As is well-known, c.k.r. leads to a set with the “best response”
property (see footnote 4) and through our equivalence theorem gives rise to
the principle of internal stability. The argument for the principle of external
stability relies heavily on Zorn’s Lemma (see Lemma 5 in Appendix II). As Ep-
stein and Wang’s (1996) general construction of types accommodate, e.g., the
ordinal expected utility (Borgers 1993), Choquet expected utility (Schmeidler
1989), and probabilistically sophisticated preferences (Machina and Schmeidler
1992), this paper thus extends Luo’s (2002) work to very general preferences
(Theorem 3). We would like to point out that there is a discrepancy between
(3.1) in Theorem 3 and the aforementioned result (i) in Luo (2002). The dis-
crepancy can be attributed mainly to the completeness of a state space (cf.
Lemma 7 in Appendix II).
The sequel of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 oﬀers a uniﬁed
framework for analyzing information, knowledge, and the “stable” pattern of
behavior. We set up the framework by resorting to some familiar apparatus
in the traditional game-theoretic literature so that it is easily accessible to
game theorists. Subsection 2.1 introduces the notion of stability; Subsection
2.2 models games in terms of epistemic states; Subsection 2.3 investigates the
related interactive epistemology; and Subsection 2.4 establishes a fundamental
equivalence theorem between a strictly dominated strategy and a never-best
reply in terms of epistemic states. Section 3 studies epistemic foundations for
stability. Subsection 3.1 introduces the notion of rationality; and Subsection 3.2
presents the main results about information, knowledge, and stability. Section
4 is devoted to discussions. For convenience, the precise deﬁnitions of “regular
preferences” and “marginal consistency” are summarized in Appendix I. To
facilitate reading, all the proofs are relegated to Appendix II.
72T h e A n a l y t i c F r a m e w o r k
In this section we provide a uniﬁed framework for analyzing strategic behav-
ior as well as its related interactive epistemology. Throughout this paper,
we consider an n-person strategic game G ≡ (N,{Xi},{ζi}), where Xi,f o r
each i ∈ N, is a compact convex metric space of player i’s strategies, and
ζi : X → [0,1] (where X ≡ ×i∈NXi) is a continuous payoﬀ function that as-
signs each strategy proﬁle x ∈ X t oan u m b e ri n[0,1]. For any subset Y ⊆ X,
a strategy yi is strictly dominated given Y if there exists xi ∈ Xi such that
ζi(xi,y −i) >ζ i(yi,y −i) for all y−i ∈ Y−i,w h e r eY−i ≡ {y−i| (xi,y −i) ∈ Y for
some xi ∈ Xi}.
2.1 Stability
F o rt h ep u r p o s eo ft h i sp a p e r ,w ee m p l o yt h ef o l l o w i n gn a t u r a le x t e n s i o no ft h e
notion of a vN-M stable set (see Luo (2001)).
Deﬁnition 1. As u b s e tK ⊆ X is a (general) stable set if it is a vN-M stable
set with respect to ÂK,w h e r ex ÂK y iﬀ,f o rs o m ei, xi strictly dominates yi
given K.
That is, a stable set K satisﬁes:
(1) [internal stability] ∀x ∈ K, y ¨K x for all y ∈ K,a n d
(2) [external stability] ∀x/ ∈ K, y ÂK x for some y ∈ K.
In other words, K is free of inner contradictions – i.e., no element in K can
be dominated by an element in K, with respect to the conditional dominance
relation ÂK.F u r t h e r m o r e , K is free of external inconsistencies – i.e., any
element outside K is dominated by some element in K, with respect to the
conditional dominance relation ÂK. Clearly, every stable set is in Cartesian-
product form. It is worthwhile to point out that, by the equivalence theorem
in Subsection 2.4, this notion of a stable set is closely related to Basu and
Weibull’s (1991) notion of a “tight” curb.
8Example 1. Consider a two-person game G =( N,{Xi},{ζi}),w h e r eN =
{1,2}, X1 = X2 =[ 0 ,1],a n df o ra l lxi,x j ∈ [0,1], i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j,
ζi(xi,x j)=xixj +( 1− xi)(1− xj).L e t K1 ≡ {(0,0)}, K2 ≡ {(0.5,0.5)},
K3 ≡ {(1,1)} and K4 ≡ [0,1] × [0,1].
Since ζi(xi,0) = 1 − xi, 0 strictly dominates any xi in (0,1] given K1.
Therefore, K1 is externally stable. As every singleton is internally stable, K1 is
a stable set. Similarly, K3 is a stable set.
Since ζi(xi,0.5) = 1,n oxi in [0,1] is strictly dominated given K2.T h u s ,
K2 violates external stability. As K2 ⊂ K4,e v e r yxi in [0,1] is not strictly
dominated given K4. Therefore, K4 is internally stable. Since the set of all
strategy proﬁles trivially satisﬁes external stability, K4 is a stable set.
2.2 Games in terms of epistemic states
In game G, each player (as a decision maker) faces uncertainty not only about
the primitive uncertainty corresponding to the strategy choices, but also about
players’ types in Harsanyi’s sense. Accordingly, the state space of states of the
world is constructed as: Ω ≡ X × T1 × T2 × ...× Tn,w h e r eTi is the space
of player i’s types. We refer to an element ω ∈ Ω as a state and to a (Borel
measurable) subset E ⊆ Ω as an event.D e n o t eb yt
ω
i player i’s type projected
at ω, and denote by x









The objects of each player’s choice are acts; i.e., Borel measurable functions
f : Ω → [0,1].D e n o t eb yF (Ω) the set of a player’s acts and by P (Ω) the set of
the preferences over F (Ω). Throughout this paper, we restrict ourselves to the
subclass of regular preferences that admit representation by utility functions –
i.e., the subclass of regular preferences that satisfy U.1-6 and U.20 in Appendix I.
Based upon Epstein and Wang’s (1996) Theorem 6.1, Ti ∼homeomorphic P (Ω),2
and let ψ : Ti → P (Ω) represent such a homeomorphism. Write the utility
function associated with t
ω











for all x0 ∈ X. (The strategy xi is also referred to as an act from
2Each player’s type space is homogeneous and each player may be ignorant of his own
types (cf. 4.3).






.) Let Pi (X) denote the set of the
preferences over the set of acts f : X → [0,1], satisfying f (xi,x −i)=f (x0
i,x −i)
for all (xi,x −i) and (x0
i,x −i) in X. In what follows, we assume that P (E) and
Pi (Y ) are well deﬁned for any E ⊆ Ω and Y ⊆ X. For the sake of brevity,
we use ui (xi) to represent the utility of the restriction of xi to E (or Y )i f





| ω ∈ E
o
. By marginal consistency




can be treated as the same provided that
preferences refer only to player i’s strategies.
G i v e na ne v e n tE,l e tP(Ω|E) denote the set of i’s preferences for which the
complement of E is null in the sense of Savage; i.e., any two acts that agree on
E a r er a n k e da si n d i ﬀerent. Say i knows E at ω if there exists a closed subset
E ⊆ E such that ψ◦t
ω
i ∈ P(Ω|E). (Some reader may prefer the term “believes




ω ∈ Ω| ψ ◦ t
ω
i ∈ P(Ω|E) for some closed set E ⊆ E
ª
.
Thus, for a closed set E,KiE =
©




.P l a y e ri’s informa-
tion structure generated by the knowledge operator Ki is the correspondence





The set Pi(ω) represents all aspects of uncertainty on the part of player i –
including uncertainty about all players’ strategic behavior, uncertainty about
the uncertainty of all players’ strategic behavior, and so on ad inﬁnitum.I t
constitutes the standard model for “diﬀerential” information.
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−i for all ω ∈ Pi (ω∗).3 The proﬁle x
ω∗
is said to be a Nash
equilibrium under general preferences.
































for all xi ∈ Xi.
102.3 Interactive epistemology
In this subsection, we start with discussing the related interactive epistemology
within the set-up in Subsection 2.2. We ﬁrst list some important properties
satisﬁed by the knowledge operator Ki and the information correspondence Pi.
Lemma 1. Ki and Pi satisfy the following properties:
K1: Ki∅ = ∅.
K2: KiΩ = Ω.







λ) for a family of closed subsets {E
λ}λ∈Λ.
K5: KiE = {ω ∈ Ω| Pi(ω) ⊆ E}.
P1: Pi(ω) is nonempty and closed.





Remark 1. The knowledge operator Ki may fail to satisfy the other three axioms
of knowledge: the axiom of knowledge, the axiom of transparency,a n dthe axiom
of wisdom (i.e., KiE ⊆ E, KiE ⊆ Ki (KiE),a n dΩ\KiE ⊆ Ki (Ω\KiE)); in
particular, the information structure is possibly non-partitional. The property
K5 gives an alternative semantic deﬁnition of knowledge.
We next introduce the notion of “common knowledge.” Roughly speaking,
an event is common knowledge if everyone knows it, and everyone knows that
everyone knows it, and everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone







for all l ≥ 2 (where K
1E ≡ KE). Deﬁne





That is, CKE is the event that E is commonly known. Say E is an self-evident
event if E ⊆ KE. Without referring to any a x i o mo fk n o w l e d g e ,w eh a v et h e
following useful properties about the common knowledge operator CK.
Lemma 2. CK satisﬁes the following properties:
CK1: CKE = K (E ∩ CKE).
CK2: ω ∈ CKE if E is a self-evident event containing ω.
112.4 Equivalence theorem
In this subsection we formulate the notion of “best response” in terms of epis-
temic states and then establish a fundamental equivalence theorem between a
“strictly dominated strategy” and a “never-best response.”
Deﬁnition 2. As t r a t e g yxi is a best response given E ⊆ Ω if, for some
ω ∈ KiE, u
ω
i (xi) ≥ u
ω
i (yi) for all yi ∈ Xi. That is, a strategy yi is a never-best




i (yi) for some xi ∈ Xi.
Theorem 1. Let E ⊆ Ω be nonempty and compact. Then, a strategy yi is a
never-best response given E if, and only if, it is strictly dominated given X
E.
Similarly, a strategy yi is said to be a never-best response given Y ⊆ X
if, for every ui ∈ Pi (Y ), ui (xi) >u i (yi) for some xi ∈ Xi.A n i m m e d i a t e
implication of Theorem 1 is the following.
Corollary 1. Let Y ⊆ X be nonempty and compact. Then, a strategy yi is a
never-best response given Y if, and only if, it is strictly dominated given Y .
Remark 2. In the case of ﬁnite games with expected utility, Pearce (1984)
ﬁrst proved that a strategy is a never-best response if and only if it is strictly
dominated; see also Luo’s (2002) Lemma 1. Corollary 1 thereby extends the
result to inﬁnite games with general preferences.
We end this section by providing an example to illustrate that, without the
compactness assumption, the equivalence theorem could not be true.
Example 3. Consider a two-person game G =( N,{Xi},{ζi}),w h e r eN =
{1,2}, X1 = X2 =[ 0 ,1],a n df o ra l lxi,x j ∈ [0,1], i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j,
ζi(xi,x j)=1− (xi − xj)2. Let us consider a noncompact event E =( 0 ,1] ×
(0,1] ×{ (t1,t 2)} where ti ∈ Ti.
Let ω ∈ KiE. Then, u
ω
i ∈ P(Ω|E) for some closed E ⊆ E.D e ﬁne r ≡
infxj∈XE
j xj.C l e a r l y , r>0 and ζi(r,xj) >ζ i(0,x j) for all xj ∈ XE
j .B y





i (0). Therefore, 0 is a never-best response given E. However,
since for all xi ∈ (0,1], ζi(0,x j) >ζ i(xi,x j) if xj <x i/2, 0 is not strictly
dominated given X
E.
123 The Epistemic Foundation of Stability
3.1 Rationality
From an epistemic perspective, at a state ω,p l a y e ri knows only the set Pi(ω).
That is, he considers it possible that the true state could be any state in Pi(ω),
but not any state outside Pi(ω). In particular, at that state player i can con-
clude only that all his plausible choices of strategy are within the scope of X
Pi(ω)
i .
We refer to X
Pi(ω)
i as i’s choice set. To do an epistemic analysis of the set-valued
solution concept, we therefore deﬁne the notion of “rationality” by requiring
that X
Pi(ω)
i c o n s i s to fa l lt h eb e s tr e p l i e si nf a c eo fe p i s t e m i cu n c e r t a i n t yPi(ω).
Formally, let
BRi(ω) ≡ {xi ∈ Xi| xi is a best response given Pi(ω)}.
Deﬁne i is rational at ω if X
Pi(ω)
i = BRi(ω).L e t Ri ≡ {ω ∈ Ω| i is rational
at ω}.L e tR ≡∩ i∈NRi d e n o t et h ee v e n tt h a t“ e v e r y o n ei sr a t i o n a l . ”
3.2 Foundation of stability
Up until now, we have imposed no essential condition on regular preferences
and hence have allowed for a rather arbitrary knowledge and information struc-
ture. In conducting an epistemic analysis of a game-theoretic solution concept,
throughout this subsection we impose a weak axiom of knowledge (for each




i whenever E ⊆ R ∩ CKR. In other words,
whenever a player knows an event of “rationality” and “common knowledge
of rationality,” then this would not be false in terms of his strategy dimension.
We are now in a position to present a central result of this section.
Theorem 2. X
R∩CKR
is the largest (w.r.t. set inclusion) stable set and, more-
over, yields iterated strict dominance.
An immediate implication of Theorem 2 is the following.
Corollary 2. X
R∩CKR
is the set of all rationalizable strategy proﬁles.4
4We here use the correlated version of Bernheim (1984) and Pearce’s (1984) rational-
izability concept. Formally, a subset Y ⊆ X is said to have the “best response property”
if, for every y ∈ Y ,e v e r yp l a y e ri’s strategy yi is a best response given Y .T h e s e t o f
rationalizable strategy proﬁles is deﬁned as the largest set with the best response property
(cf. Epstein’s (1997) Deﬁnition 3.1).
13Next, we extend Luo’s (2002) main results to the general framework of this











That is, A1 states that each player has better information regarding his own
choice(s) than an opponent does; A2 states that in purely noncooperative sit-
uations, each player would be aware of the “independence” of players’ choices.
Let Ψ(ω) ≡ ×i∈NX
Pi(ω)
i denote the Cartesian product of players’ choice sets.
Theorem 3. (3.1) Suppose ω ∈ R.T h e n , Ψ(ω) is an externally stable set
and, moreover, there is a stable set K ⊇ Ψ(ω) whenever ω ∈ CKR.( 3 . 2 )
Suppose that X
Pi(ω) ⊆ Ψ(ω) for all i – i.e., every player knows “choice sets”.
Then, ω ∈ R iﬀ Ψ(ω) is a stable set. (3.3) Suppose that K is a self-evident
event satisfying K =
n
ω ∈ Ω| X
Pi(ω) ⊆ Ψ(ω)=K
o
.T h e n ,K ⊆ R ∩ CKR
whenever K is a stable set. (3.4) For any compact stable set K,t h e r ei sω ∈
R ∩ CKR such that Ψ(ω)=K.
Remark 3. Following J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, a stable set is
viewed as a prevailing social norm in a society. Accordingly, a social norm is
“well known to the community” (see Shubik 1982, p. 261). Under this sort
of assumption of social knowledge, (3.2) states that the “stable” pattern of
behavior is sustained by rational players and moreover, the “stable” pattern
of behavior is attributed only to rational players. The following two examples
illustrate that the conditions in (3.2) are indispensable.
Example 3 Continued. In the game G of Example 3, let us consider two cases:









.5 Then, Ψ(ω)=[ 2 /3,1] × [0,1]. In this case, 2 does not
know Ψ(ω) since X
P2(ω) * Ψ(ω).C l e a r l y , ω ∈ R. However, since for any
x1 ∈ [2/3,1],
ζ2(x1,1) ≥ 8/9 > 5/9 ≥ ζ2(x1,0),
1 strictly dominates 0 given Ψ(ω). Therefore, Ψ(ω) violates internal stability.
5See Lemma 7 in Appendix II for existence of such a state.














1 .C l e a r l y , Ψ(ω) is a stable set. However, since for each
x2 ∈ [0,2/3),
ζ2(2/3,x 1) >ζ 2(x2,x 1) for all x1 ∈ [2/3,1],
by U.20, u2(2/3) >u 2(x2) for all u2 ∈ P(Ω|P2(ω)). That is, player 2 is not
rational at ω.
Example 4. Consider a three-person game G =( N,{Xi}, {ζi}),w h e r eN =
{1,2,3}, Xi =[ 0 ,1],a n df o ra l lxi,x j,x k ∈ [0,1], i,j,k =1 ,2,3, i 6= j, i 6= k
and j<˙ k, ζi(xi,x j,x k)=1− [xi − (2xj − xk)]
2.L e tω ∈ Ω satisfy















Then, Ψ(ω)=[ 0 ,1/2] × [0,1/2] × [0,1/2]. In this case, A2 is violated since
(0,1/2,0) / ∈ X
P1(ω), for example. Clearly, ω ∈ R. However, since for x2 =1 /2
and x3 =0 ,
ζ1(1,1/2,0) = 1 > 3/4 ≥ ζ1(x1,1/2,0) for all x1 ∈ [0,1/2],
every x1 ∈ Ψ1 (ω) does not strictly dominate 1 given Ψ(ω).A s 1 / ∈ Ψ1 (ω),
Ψ(ω) violates external stability.
We end this section by providing an example of a noncompact stable set,
which illustrates that the compactness condition in (3.4) is indispensable.
Example 5. Consider a two-person game G =( N,{Xi},{ζi}),w h e r eN =
{1,2}, X1 = X2 =[ 0 ,1],a n df o ra l lxi,x j ∈ [0,1], i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j,
ζi(xi,x j)=m i n {xi,x j}.L e t K ≡ (0,1] × (0,1].S i n c e i f xi 6=0and xj 6=0 ,
then ζi(xi,x j) > 0, 0 is strictly dominated given K. Therefore, K is externally
stable. Moreover, any xi ∈ (0,1] is not strictly dominated given K since for
xj = xi, ζi(xi,x j) ≥ ζi(x0
i,x j) for all x0
i ∈ [0,1]. Therefore, K is internally
stable. Thus, K is a noncompact stable set.
154D i s c u s s i o n s
4.1 Epistemic games. Note that a strategic game G ≡ (N,{Xi},{ζi}) does not
specify players’ preferences in the face of uncertainty; it speciﬁes only players’
payoﬀ functions ζi. From an epistemic perspective, a complete outcome of the
game G is summarized by a state. A “transparent” game associated with G is
d e t e r m i n e db ye p i s t e m i ct y p e s .F o r m a l l y ,a“ t r a n s p a r e n t ”g a m ea tt y p ep r o ﬁle
















where ψ◦t =( ψ ◦ t1,ψ◦ t2,...,ψ◦ tn). The whole state space Ω can be viewed


















Within our framework in this paper, the statement “a game is common knowl-
edge” is a formal statement rather than an informal “meta-sense”: A game is
common knowledge if, and only if, the game, as a subset of states, is commonly
known (see also Zamir and Vassilakis 1993, pp. 496-497). For example, the
“opaque” game is commonly known.
4.2 The rationale for associating a set with a state. To do an epistemic
analysis of the set-valued solution concept of the stable set, it is easy to see
that we have to associate a set with a state. Within the conventional semantic
framework, Luo (2002) studied epistemic foundations behind the criterion of
stability. In particular, at a state ω,p l a y e ri is exogenously associated with
a nonempty subset of strategies Ψi (ω). In our framework in this paper, this
set should be viewed as endogenous s i n c ei ti sd e d u c e df r o mt h ei n f o r m a t i o n
structure Pi (ω),i . e . ,Ψi (ω)=X
Pi(ω)
i .
While in Savage’s framework of a single-person’s decision making, the deci-
sion maker would be well aware of his choice that aﬀects no states, this is not
16appropriate here. In the context of strategic interaction, each player’s choice of
strategy should be included in the description of a state since each player must
take into account the choices of the other players. For example, the choice of
strategy by i should depend on the choice of strategy by j that, in turn, should
depend on the choice of strategy by i.6 Indeed, a player may not know his own
choice of strategy in games with imperfect recall (cf. Rubinstein 1998, Chapter
4).
Of course, a player can do whatever he wants, but he might not know what
it is he wants, because what a player wants to do often depends on what others
want to do (see also 4.3). Consequently, if a player unconsciously makes a
choice, then he certainly does not know his own choice; if a player consciously
makes a choice, then he perhaps does not know his own choice, because the
player might not know what it is he wants. Although a state of the world
does specify a strategy for a player, the player simply may not know his own
strategy in the face of epistemic uncertainty. What he knows is only the scope
of strategies. The correlation of strategy allowed in our framework could be
another origin for the ignorance of one’s own strategy choice.
It is easy to see that i knows his strategy x
ω







. From an epistemic viewpoint, the requirement that a player knows his
own using strategy seems to be rather a restrictive assumption in strategic
settings. The following example demonstrates this point.
Example 6. Consider a two-person game G. For simplicity, we consider only the
probabilistic notion of knowledge – i.e., “belief with probability 1.” Consider
four states as follows:
6J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern oﬀered a defensive and concealment rationale
for mixing play in zero-sum games:
Thus one important consideration for a player in such a game is to protect
himself against having his intentions found out by his opponent. Playing
several such strategies at random, so that only their probabilities are deter-
mined is a very eﬀective way to achieve a degree of such protection: By this
device the opponent cannot possibly ﬁnd out what the player’s strategy is
going to be, since the player does not know it himself (von Neumann and
Morgenstern 1944, p. 146).
Therefore, this classical rationale posits that a player may show a tendency to consciously




ω1 =( x1,x 2;t1,t 2)
ω2 =( x0
1,x 2;t1,t 2)






Since Ti ∼homeomorphic ∆(X ×Ti ×Tj),w el e tµt1 = ψ ◦t1 and µt0





1/2, if i =1 ,2
0, if i =3 ,4 and µt0




{ω1,ω 2}, if ω = ω1,ω2
{ω1,ω 2,ω 3,ω 4}, if ω = ω3,ω4
.
While player 1 knows his own type at ω1,h ed o e sn o tk n o wh i so w ns t r a t e g y
at that state since X
Pi(ω)
1 = {x1,x 0
1}.
4.3 Ignorance of own type. Note that Ti ∼homeomorphic P (Ω).Ap l a y e rw i t h
an epistemic type is uncertain not only about the strategy proﬁles, but also
about the type proﬁles.7 In particular, the player is uncertain about his own
types or own preferences (see also Heifetz and Samet’s (1998, p. 330) Remark).
In Example 6, at ω3 player 1 does not know whether his type is t1 or t0
1.
In the case of a single-person decision making, this viewpoint relates to the
decision maker’s introspection – i.e., he is uncertain not only about the true
state of nature, but also about his preferences about this uncertainty, his pref-
erences about his preferences about this uncertainty, and so on. As Epstein and
Wang (1996, p. 1352) wrote, “... it seems natural given an agent who does not
perfectly understand the nature of the primitive state space ... and who re-
ﬂects on the nature and degree of his misunderstanding. ... uncertainty about
own preferences has been shown to be useful also in modeling preference for
ﬂexibility (Kreps (1979)) and behavior given unforeseen contingencies (Kreps
(1992)).” The viewpoint of the ignorance of one’s own type puts forward a novel
interpretation for using the notion of choice sets in orthodox choice theory.
7To expound his theory of games with incomplete information, Harsanyi (1967, p. 171)
articulated that: “Each player is assumed to know his own actual type” (cf. also Harsanyi
1995, p. 296). To make sense of the notion of a Bayesian equilibrium, each player should
also be aware of his own using strategy.
184.4 The deﬁnition of rationality.T h es e t - u pu s e di nt h ep a p e ri sat h o r o u g h
framework for analyzing a set-valued solution concept. Speciﬁcally, player i’s
choice set associated with a state ω is given by Ψi (ω)=X
Pi(ω)
i .F r o m a n
epistemic perspective, at a state ω, i knows only the set Pi(ω) – i.e., he
considers it possible that the true state could be any state in Pi(ω), but not
any state outside Pi(ω). In particular, at that state player i can conclude only
that all his plausible choices of strategy are within the scope of Ψi (ω).W e
deﬁne the notion of “rationality” by requiring that the choice set Ψi (ω) consists
of all the best replies in face of epistemic uncertainty Pi(ω).8 Accordingly,
rationality requires not only that every plausible choice of strategy in Ψi (ω)
can be “justiﬁable,” but also that any choice of strategy outside Ψi (ω) cannot
be “justiﬁed.” The requirement for rationality reﬂects, at an individual level,
von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944, p. 41) philosophy of interpretation of
stability as stable “standard of behavior.”
The notion of “rationality” used in this paper is based upon the epistemic
aspects. To see this, let t0
i and t00
i be two plausible types that a rational type
ti cannot exclude. Suppose that x0
i and x00
i are best responses with respect to
ψ◦t0
i and ψ◦t00
i, respectively. The rational type ti would not preclude x0
i and x00
i
from ti’s disposal choices, and should preclude all the strategies that are not a
best response to any of his types that he cannot exclude.9 In contrast, Epstein










i (yi) for all yi ∈ Xi.
To make sense of this sort of deﬁnition, a player would be aware of his own
true type and of his own using strategy. By P2 in Lemma 1, the information
structure is thereby partitional in the type dimension. Subsequently, this deﬁ-
nition of rationality arises the question about its applicability in general cases
where players are boundedly rational with non-partitional information struc-
tures. From a diﬀerent perspective, Morris (1996) also pointed out that there
is an intrinsic inconsistency between the non-partitional information structures
and Bayesian rationality, because using Bayes rule entails information struc-
tures to be partitional; cf. also Epstein and Le Breton (1993).
8This deﬁnition of “rationality” is the same as Luo’s (2002). Samuelson (1992) also
used a similar notion to discuss the “common knowledge of admissibility.”
9The true preferences are irrelevant to evaluating optimal choices. Only the perceivable
and conscious preferences matter for this evaluation. See also Harsanyi’s (1997) discussion
on “actual” vs. “informed” preferences.
19We would like to point out that by Theorem 2 and Corollary 2, Epstein’s
(1997) Theorem 3.2 can be improved by replacing the relation of “never-best
response” with the more conventional “payoﬀ dominance” relation. Conse-
quently, rationality as well as c.k.r. in Epstein’s sense give the same prediction
– iterated strict dominance. As emphasized above, Theorem 2 does not rely
on the strong epistemic assumption that a player be aware of his own true type
and of his own using strategy, however.10 In fact, Theorem 2 still holds true
for a weaker version of rationality: X
Pi(ω)
i ⊆ BRi(ω).
4.5 The exogenous vs. endogenous models of knowledge.I n t h e s e m a n t i c
framework, the information structure is exogenously given. In contrast, the
information structure is endogenously determined in the framework of this pa-
per. The distinction between exogenous and endogenous models of knowledge
gives rise to some diﬀerent ways of approaching epistemology. For example,
within the semantic framework it is interesting to ask a question: Is there a
model of knowledge in which a game-theoretic solution is sustained under some
appealing epistemic conditions? The question is no longer an issue within the
framework of this paper.
4.6 The completeness of a state space. In this paper a state is viewed as an
endogenous variable since a state is constructed by strategies and Harsanyi’s
types. A state speciﬁes what every player does, and what every player thinks
about what every player does, and so on; it speciﬁes every player’s preferences,
and every player’s preferences about every player’s preferences, and so on; it
speciﬁes what every player knows, and what every player knows about what
every player knows, and so on. The state space includes all possible states and
is intrinsically inﬁnite. The completeness of a state space is crucial for our main
r e s u l t si nt h i sp a p e r .
Finally, while throughout this paper we restrict attention to a subclass of
regular preferences, all results here are not conﬁn e dw i t ht h er e s t r i c t i o n . A s
pointed out by Epstein (1997), our analysis can be applied to other speciﬁc
models of preferences; for example, the subjective expected utility model, the
ordinal expected utility model, the probabilistic sophistication model, the Cho-
quet expected utility model, and so on.
10Aumann (1987, 1995) so clearly made the assumption that each player knows which
strategy he chooses; i.e., the so-called “measurability of strategy with respect to informa-
tion structure.”
20Appendix I: Regular Preferences and Marginal Consistency
Let Fu(Ω)={f ∈ F(Ω)| f(Ω) is ﬁnite; f−1 ([r, 1]) is closed for any r ∈ [0,1]}.
Let Fl(Ω)={f ∈ F(Ω)| f(Ω) is ﬁnite; f−1 ((r, 1]) is open for any r ∈ [0,1]}.
A preference is said to be regular if it has a numerical representation u : F(Ω) →
[0,1] satisfying:
U.1. Certainty Equivalence: u(r)=r, ∀r ∈ [0,1].
U.2. Weak Monotonicity: f0 ≥ f ⇒ u(f0) ≥ u(f), ∀f,f0 ∈ F(Ω).
U.3. Inner Regularity: u(f)=s u p{u(g):g ≤ f,g ∈ Fu(Ω)}, ∀f ∈ F(Ω).
U.4. Outer Regularity: u(g)=i n f
©
u(h):h ≥ g,h ∈ Fl(Ω)
ª
, ∀g ∈ Fu(Ω).
F o rt h ep u r p o s eo ft h i sp a p e r ,w ea d dt h ef o l l o w i n gc o n d i t i o n s . 11
U.5. Uniform Equicontinuity: ∀ε>0, ∃δ such that for every u ∈ P(Ω)
|u(f) − u(f
0)| <ε , whenever supω∈Ω|f(ω) − f
0(ω)| <δ .
U.6. Preference-model Closedness: For any closed subset E ⊆ Ω, P(E) is
closed.
U.20. Strong Monotonicity: For any subset E ⊆ Ω and any u ∈ P(E),
f0 >f⇒ u(f0) >u (f), ∀f,f0 ∈ F(E).
Marginal consistency is introduced as a primitive requirement in a case
where a player is endowed with an arbitrary set of preferences. For the spe-
cial case of regular preferences, the “marginal consistency” can be deﬁned
as follows. Let Fi (X) denote the set of acts f : X → [0,1], satisfying
f (xi,x −i)=f (x0
i,x −i) for all (xi,x −i) and (x0
i,x −i) in X. For any E ⊆ Ω and
u ∈ P(E), the “restriction of u to Fi (X)” is referred as a preference in Pi(X
E),
denoted by mrgFi(X)u.S a yu satisﬁes the marginal consistency if, ∀g ∈ Fi (X),




= f (ω) (in particular,
mrgFi(X)u(xi)=u(xi) ∀xi ∈ Xi); hence,
n




11We assume that F(Ω) is endowed with sup-norm topology and that P(E) is endowed
with Epstein and Wang’s (1996) topology.
21Appendix II: Proofs
Lemma 1. Ki and Pi satisfy the following properties:
K1: Ki∅ = ∅.
K2: KiΩ = Ω.







λ) for a family of closed subsets {E
λ}λ∈Λ.
K5: KiE = {ω ∈ Ω| Pi(ω) ⊆ E}.
P1: Pi(ω) is nonempty and closed.





Proof. Clearly, K1 holds by U.1; K2 and K3 hold by the deﬁnition of knowl-
edge. To prove K4,n o t et h a tX satisﬁes the second axiom of countability –
i.e., the topology on X has a countable basis – since X is a compact metric
space (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border 1999, Chapter 3). We divide this proof
into the following three steps.
Step 1. Ω satisﬁes the second axiom of countability.
By the construction of a type space, Ω ⊆ Ω0×(×∞
k=0Pn(Ωk)),w h e r eΩ0 = X
and Ωk = Ωk−1×Pn(Ωk−1) for k ≥ 1. By the fact that the countable Cartesian
product of the second countable spaces is the second countable, it suﬃces to
show that P(X) satisﬁes the second axiom of countability.
Following Epstein and Wang (1996), consider the topology on P(X) gener-
ated by the subbasis consisting of:
{u : u(g) <r , g ∈ F
u(X), r ∈ [0,1]} and {u : u(h) >r , h ∈ F
l(X), r ∈ [0,1]}.
Let Bτ be a countable basis of this topology on X,a n dl e t
B ≡
©
B| B = ∪
K
k=1Bk,B k ∈ Bτ
ª
,
where K is a positive integer, and let
C ≡ {C| C = X\B,B ∈ B}.


















qk1Bk; qk ∈ Q and Bk ∈ B
)
,
where Q is the set of all rational numbers in [0,1]. Clearly, b Fu(X) and b Fl(X)
are both countable sets. Now consider the following class of sets, denoted by
E:
{u : u(g) <q , g ∈ b F
u(X), q ∈ Q} and {u : u(h) >q , h ∈ b F
l(X), q ∈ Q}.
Note that h ∈ Fl(X) can be expressed as h = ΣK
k=1rk1Gk,w h e r erk ∈ [0,1] and
Gk is open in X (cf. Epstein and Wang 1996, p. 1366). Since Bτ is a countable
basis, Gk = ∪∞
l=1Bl,k (where Bl,k ∈ Bτ). For r, rk ∈ [0,1],w ec a nﬁnd qm,k ↑ rk
and qk ↓ r,w h e r eqm,k, qk ∈ Q.D e ﬁne hm ≡ ΣK
k=1qm,k1∪m
l=1Bl,k. Clearly, hm ≤ h
and hm(x) ↑ h(x) for each x ∈ X. Now by U.3, for any ε>0,t h e r ee x i s t s
g ≤ h, g ∈ Fu(Ω) such that
u(h) − ε<u (g) ≤ u(h).
By U.5, without loss of generality we may assume g<h .S i n c e g ∈ Fu(X)
can be expressed as g = ΣK0
k=1r0
k1Fk,w h e r er0
k ∈ [0,1] and Fk is closed in X (cf.
Epstein and Wang 1996, p. 1366). Therefore, hm ≥ g for suﬃciently large m.
Thus, u(hm) ↑ u(h). Hence,





{u : u(hm) >q k}.
Similarly, we have





{u : u(gm) <q k}.
Thus, E generates the topology on P(X).S i n c eE is countable, P(X) satisﬁes
the second axiom of countability.
Step 2. KiE ∩ KiF ⊆ Ki(E ∩ F) for any closed sets E,F ⊆ Ω.
23Let ω ∈ KiE ∩ KiF.S i n c e E and F are closed, u
ω




















i (1E∩Ff), ∀f ∈ F(Ω).












λ}λ∈Λ be a family of closed subsets of Ω. Since,
by Step 1, Ω satisﬁes the second axiom of countability, it follows that there

























Without loss of generality, ∀k > 1,E k ⊇ E
λ0
for some λ
0 ∈ Λ. Since ω ∈ T
λ∈Λ KiE
λ, ω ∈ KiE


















λ.B yS t e p2 ,ω ∈ KiE
k
, ∀k > 1. The result therefore follows from
Epstein and Wang’s (1996) Theorem 4.4.
K5:L e tω ∈ KiE. By the deﬁnition of Pi(ω), Pi(ω) ⊆ E.T h u s ,KiE ⊆
{ω ∈ Ω| Pi(ω) ⊆ E}. Conversely, suppose Pi(ω) ⊆ E. By the proof of P1 in
Lemma 1, K3 and K4 jointly imply that
\
{E⊆Ω| KiE3ω and E is closed}
KiE ⊆ KiE.
Therefore, ω ∈ KiE.T h u s ,KiE ⊇ {ω ∈ Ω| Pi(ω) ⊆ E}.
24P1:B yt h ed e ﬁnition of KiE, it is easy to see that ω ∈ KiE if, and only if,





{E⊆Ω| KiE3ω and E is closed}
E.
Hence, Pi(ω) is closed. Assume, in negation, that Pi(ω)=∅.B yK5, ω ∈ Ki∅,
which contradicts K1.




i , ψ ◦ t
ω
i = ψ ◦ t
ω
i . Therefore, for any E ⊆ Ω, ω ∈ KiE iﬀ
ω0 ∈ KiE. Hence, Pi(ω)=Pi(ω0).
Lemma 2. CK satisﬁes the following properties:
CK1: CKE = K (E ∩ CKE).
CK2: ω ∈ CKE if E is a self-evident event containing ω.
Proof. CK1:B yK5,w eh a v e
K (E ∩ CKE)=KE ∩ K (CKE)






CK2:S i n c e E is self-evident, E ⊆ KE.B y K3, Kl−1E ⊆ KlE for all
l ≥ 2.S i n c eω ∈ E, ω ∈ KlE for all l ≥ 1.
Theorem 1. Let E ⊆ Ω be nonempty and compact. Then, a strategy yi is a
never-best response given E if, and only if, it is strictly dominated given X
E.
To prove Theorem 1, we need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3. P(E) is convex.
Proof of Lemma 3. For any u1,u 2 ∈ P(E) and α ∈ [0,1], we proceed to
verify that αu1 +( 1− α)u2 ∈ P(E). Obviously, U.1, U.2, U.20,U . 5 ,a n dU . 6
hold. Let f ∈ F(E). Then,
[αu1 +( 1− α)u2](f)
= αu1(f)+( 1− α)u2(f)
=s u p {αu1(g):g ≤ f,g ∈ F
u(E)} +s u p{(1 − α)u2(g):g ≤ f,g ∈ F
u(E)}
≥ sup{αu1(g)+( 1− α)u2(g):g ≤ f,g ∈ F
u(E)}
=s u p {[αu1 +( 1− α)u2](g):g ≤ f,g ∈ F
u(E)}.
25Moreover, for suﬃciently small ε>0,t h e r ee x i s tg1,g 2 ∈ Fu(E) such that
g1 ≤ f, g2 ≤ f, u1(g1) >u 1(f) − ε,a n du2(g2) >u 2(f) − ε.D e ﬁne g0(ω) ≡
max[g1(ω),g 2(ω)]. Clearly, g0 ∈ Fu(E) and g0 ≤ f. By U.2, it follows that





≥ αu1(g1)+( 1− α)u2(g2)
≥ αu1(f)+( 1− α)u2(f) − ε
=[ αu1 +( 1− α)u2](f) − ε.
Thus, U.3 holds. Similarly, U.4 holds.
Lemma 4. Let Y ⊆ X.T h e n ,ui(xi) >u i(yi) for all ui ∈ Pi (Y ) if xi strictly
dominates yi given Y . Moreover, when Y is closed, xi strictly dominates yi
given Y if ui(xi) >u i(yi) for all ui ∈ Pi (Y ).
Proof of Lemma 4. Deﬁne E ≡ Y ×{ t} where t ∈ T1 × T2 × ...× Tn.







−i)=yi(ω) for all ω ∈ E.B yU . 2 0, ui(xi) >u i(yi)
for all ui ∈ P (E). By marginal consistency, ui(xi) >u i(yi) for all ui ∈ Pi (Y ).
Suppose that ui(xi) >u i(yi) for all ui ∈ Pi (Y ). By marginal consistency,
ui(xi) >u i(yi) for all ui ∈ P (E). For any ω ∈ E, ui(xi) >u i(yi) for all
ui ∈ P (E|{ω}).S i n c e Y is closed, E is compact. By U.1 and Epstein and
Wang’s (1996) Theorem 4.3, it follows that xi(ω)=ui(xi) >u i(yi)=yi(ω) for




−i) for all ω ∈ E.S i n c e
X
E
−i = Y−i, ζi(xi,y −i) >ζ i(yi,y −i) for all y−i ∈ Y−i.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 1.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 . “if part”: Let xi strictly dominate yi given X
E.B y




. By marginal consistency,
ui (xi) >u i (yi) for all ui ∈ P(E). By Epstein and Wang’s (1996) Theo-
rem 4.3, P(E) ∼homeomorphic P(Ω|E).L e t ϕ : P(E) → P(Ω|E) be such a
homeomorphism. By the proof of Epstein and Wang’s (1996) Theorem 4.3,
ϕ ◦ ui(x0
i)=ui(x0
i) for all x0
i ∈ Xi.T h e r e f o r e , ϕ ◦ ui (xi) >ϕ◦ ui (yi) for all




i (yi) for all u
ω
i ∈ P(Ω|E).S i n c eE is compact, it




i (yi) for all ω ∈ KiE.




N0 = {i,−i}, X0
i = Xi,a n dX0
−i = P(E).D e ﬁne the payoﬀ function in G0 as
ζ
0
i(xi,u i) ≡ u
ω
i (xi) − u
ω
i (yi),f o ra l lxi ∈ X
0
i and ui ∈ P(E),
26where u
ω
i ∈ P(Ω|E) and u
ω
i = ϕ ◦ ui. By U.6 in Appendix I, P(E) is compact.
By Lemma 3, P(E) is convex. By Epstein and Wang’s (1996) Theorem 3.1,
P(E) is Hausdorﬀ. B yc o n t i n u i t yo fϕ and by U.5 in Appendix I, ζ
0
i(·,·) is
continuous (see the veriﬁcation below). Now, by Glicksberg’s (1952) Theorem,
there exists a Nash equilibrium (x∗
i,u ∗
i) in G0. However, since yi is a never-best











































i (yi) for all u
ω
i ∈ P(Ω|E). By the proof of Epstein and






i) for all x0




i) >ϕ −1 ◦ u
ω
i (yi) for all u
ω
i ∈ P(Ω|E).S i n c e P(E) ∼homeomorphic
P(Ω|E), it follows that ui (x∗
i) >u i (yi) for all ui ∈ P(E). By marginal consis-
tency, ui (x∗









0(·,·): We denote the metric for Xi by di and denote the metric
for X by d(x,x0)=
pPn
i=1 di(xi,x 0
i)2 for all x,x0 ∈ X.
Step 1. If xm
i → xi, supω∈Ω|xm
i (ω) − xi(ω)| → 0.
Since ζi(.) is continuous and X is compact, ζi(.) is uniformly continuous on
X. Hence, for any ε>0, there exists δ such that whenever di(xm
i ,x i) <δ ,w e
have |xm





−i)| <εfor all ω.
Step 2. For any continuous function f ∈ F(Ω), u
m (f) → u(f) as u
m → u.
To prove this, it suﬃces to show that, for all real numbers r, {u : u(f) >r }







1Gmj,w h e r eGmj = {ω : f(ω) >j 2
−m}.
27Clearly, fm ↑ f uniformly. By U.5,
{u : u(f) >r } =
∞ [
m=1
{u : u(fm) >r }.
Thus, {u : u(f) >r } is open. Similarly, {u : u(f) <r } is open.
Step 3. ζ
0
i(xi,u i) is jointly continuous.
Let (xm
i ,u m
i ) → (xi,u i) be a convergent sequence in Xi ×P (E).L e t
ε>0 be suﬃciently small. Then, by Step 1 and U.5, for suﬃciently large
m, |u0
i(xm
i ) − u0
i(xi)| <ε / 3 for all u0
i ∈ P(E).S i n c e t h e p a y o ﬀ function ζi (·)
is continuous, it therefore follows that xi is a continuous act. By Step 2, for
suﬃciently large m, |um
i (xi)−ui(xi)| <ε / 3 and |um








i ) − ζ
0




i ) − u
ω
i (xi)| + |u
ωm







i ) − u
ωm
i (xi)| + |u
ωm









Corollary 1. Let Y ⊆ X be nonempty and compact. Then, a strategy yi is a
never-best response given Y if, and only if, it is strictly dominated given Y .
Proof. Deﬁne E ≡ Y ×{t} where t ∈ T1×T2×...×Tn.B yt h eT y c h o n o ﬀ Theo-
rem, E is nonempty and compact. Therefore,[yi is strictly dominated given Y]
⇐⇒ by Theorem 1 [yi is a never-best response given E] ⇐⇒ by Deﬁnition 2 [for every




i (yi) for some xi ∈ Xi] ⇐⇒ by the compactness of E [for every
ui ∈ P(Ω|E), ui (xi) >u i (yi) for some xi ∈ Xi]⇐⇒ by Epstein and Wang’s (1996) Theorem 4.3
[for every ui ∈ P(E), ui (xi) >u i (yi) for some xi ∈ Xi] ⇐⇒ by marginal consistency




is the largest (w.r.t. set inclusion) stable set and,
moreover, yields iterated strict dominance.
28To prove Theorem 2, we need the following three lemmas.
Lemma 5. Suppose that xi ∈ Xi is strictly dominated given Y 6= ∅.T h e n ,
there exists x∗
i ∈ Xi such that (a) x∗
i strictly dominates xi given Y ;a n d( b )x∗
i
is not strictly dominated given Y .






i ∈ Xi| x
0
i strictly dominates xi given Y },







i strictly dominates y0






Clearly, any maximal strategy in X0
i is a strictly undominated dominator of xi.
By Zorn’s Lemma, it remains to verify that every totally-ordered subset of X0
i
has an upper bound in X0
i.L e tX00
i be a totally-ordered subset of X0
i.S i n c eXi
is compact, X00
i has a convergent subnet xλ
i → x∗
i in Xi.B yc o n t i n u i t yo fζi,f o r





increasingly converges to ζi (x∗







for all y−i ∈ Y−i,t h e nx∗
i Â xλ
























i . Therefore, x∗
i < xλ
i for all xλ








i for all x0
i ∈ X00
i .A sxλ
i Â xi, x∗




Lemma 6. K is a stable set iﬀ K 6= ∅ and K =
©
x ∈ X| y ¨K x ∀y ∈ X
ª
.
Proof. Suppose that K is a stable set. Then, K 6= ∅.A s t h e e x t e r n a l s t a -
bility of K implies that K ⊇
©
x ∈ X| y ¨K x ∀y ∈ X
ª
,i ts u ﬃces to verify
that K ⊆
©
x ∈ X| y ¨K x ∀y ∈ X
ª
. Assume, in negation, that there exists
x ∈ K\
©
x ∈ X| y ¨K x ∀y ∈ X
ª
. Then, for some i, xi is strictly dominated
given K. By Lemma 5, there exists x∗
i ∈ Xi such that (a) x∗
i strictly dominates
yi given K;a n d( b )x∗
i is not strictly dominated given K.D e ﬁne y ≡ (x∗
i,x −i).
Clearly, y ∈ K and y ÂK x, contradicting the internal stability of K.
Suppose that K 6= ∅ and K =
©
x ∈ X| y ¨K x ∀y ∈ X
ª
.C l e a r l y , K is
internally stable. Let x/ ∈ K. Then, for some i, xi is strictly dominated given
K. By Lemma 5, there exists x∗
i ∈ Xi such that (a) x∗
i strictly dominates xi
given K;a n d( b )x∗
i is not strictly dominated given K.S i n c e K 6= ∅,t h e r ei s






.C l e a r l y ,y ∈ K and y ÂK x.T h u s ,K is externally
stable.
Lemma 7. Suppose that Y ⊆ X is nonempty and closed. Then, there exists





29Proof. Let Ω0 ≡ X,a n dl e tΩk ≡ Ωk−1 ×P n(Ωk−1) for all k ≥ 1.S i n c e X
is a compact metric space, Y has a countable dense subset {xm}∞
m=1 (see, e.g.,




any f ∈ F(X). Clearly, u0
i ∈ P(X). For any f ∈ F(Ωk),a n yk ≥ 1 and































i .D e ﬁne
ti ≡ (u0
i,u 1
i,...),a n dd e ﬁne ui(f) ≡
∞ P
m=1
2−mf(xm;t1,...,t n) for any f ∈ F(X ×
T0
1 × ...× T0
n),w h e r eT0
j = ×∞
k=0P(Ωk) for j =1 ,...,n. Clearly, ui ∈ P(X ×
T0
1 × ...× T0
n) and mrgF(Ωk)ui = uk
i ∀k. By Epstein and Wang’s Theorem
D.2, ψ ◦ ti = ui.S i n c e ui ∈ P(X × T0
1 × ...× T0
n|Y ×{ (t1,...,tn)}), ti ∈ Ti
(see Epstein and Wang’s (1996) Section 5). Deﬁne ω ≡ (y;t1,...,tn) where
y ∈ Y .A s u
ω
i = ψ ◦ ti, u
ω

















.S i n c e{xm}∞
m=1 is dense in Y ,f o r
any closed proper subset Y 0 ⊂ Y ,t h e r ei ss o m exm in (X\Y 0) ∩ Y .T h e r e f o r e ,
u
ω












and, moreover, ω ∈ Pi(ω).
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 2.






l−1| ∃i ∃x ∈ D
l−1 s.t. xi strictly dominates yi given D
l−1o
.
Deﬁne D ≡∩ ∞
l=0Dl. We prove Theorem 2 by the following three steps.
Step 1. D is a stable set.
(1) [internal stability]. Let x ∈ D. By Dufwenberg and Stegeman’s (2002)
Theorem 1, it follows that for all y ∈ D and for all i, yi does not strictly
dominate xi given D.T h u s ,y ¨D x for all y ∈ D.
(2) [external stability]. Let x/ ∈ D. Then, x/ ∈ Dl for some l ≥ 1.T h e r e f o r e ,
for some i, xi is strictly dominated given Dl.A sD ⊆ Dl, xi is strictly dominated
given D. By Dufwenberg and Stegeman’s (2002) Lemma, for some y ∈ D, yi
strictly dominates xi given D.T h u s ,y ÂD x for some y ∈ D.
30Step 2. D is the largest stable set.
Let K be a stable set. By Lemma 6, K ⊆
©
x ∈ X| y ¨K x ∀y ∈ X
ª
.T h e r e -




Let ω ∈ R ∩ CKR.S i n c eω ∈ Ri, X
Pi(ω)
i = BRi (ω) for all i.S i n c eb yK5




i .S i n c e b y CK1 in Lemma 2, Pi(ω)




i .T h e r e f o r e ,x
ω
i is a
best response given Pi(ω). By Theorem 1, x
ω
i is not strictly dominated given
X
Pi(ω). Since again by CK1, Pi(ω) ⊆ R ∩ CKR, for all i, x
ω




ω ∈ Dl for all l ≥ 0.T h u s ,X
R∩CKR
⊆ D.
By Dufwenberg and Stegeman’s (2002) Theorem 1, D is nonempty and
compact. By Lemma 7, there exists ω such that ω ∈ Pi(ω) and Pi(ω)=D×{t
ω}
∀i.B yS t e p1a n dL e m m a6 ,
D = {x ∈ X| for all i, xi is not strictly dominated given D}.
By Theorem 1, BRi(ω)=X
Pi(ω)





i for all ω0 ∈ Pi(ω), Pi(ω) ⊆ R.L e tE ≡ D×{ t
ω}.
As by P1, Pi(ω0)=E for all ω0 ∈ E, E is a self-evident event containing ω.B y
CK2 in Lemma 2, ω ∈ CKE.S i n c eE ⊆ R, ω ∈ R ∩ CKR.S i n c eb yCK1,





is the set of all rationalizable strategy proﬁles.
Proof. Deﬁne
L ≡∪ K⊆{x∈X| y¨Kx ∀y∈X}K.
Since, for all l ≥ 0, K ⊆ Dl whenever K ⊆
©
x ∈ X| y ¨K x ∀y ∈ X
ª
, L ⊆ D.
By Step 1 and Lemma 6, D ⊆
©
x ∈ X| y ¨D x ∀y ∈ X
ª
. Therefore, L = D
and L ⊆
©
x ∈ X| y ¨L x ∀y ∈ X
ª
. By Dufwenberg and Stegeman’s (2002)
Theorem 1, D is nonempty and compact. By Corollary 1, L has the best
response property. Since by Lemma 4, every best response is a strictly undom-
inated strategy, it is easy to see that K ⊆
©
x ∈ X| y ¨K x ∀y ∈ X
ª
whenever
K has the best response property. Thus, L is the largest set with the best
response property. By Theorem 1, X
R∩CKR
= L.T h a ti s ,X
R∩CKR
is the set of
all rationalizable strategy proﬁles.
31Theorem 3. (3.1) Suppose ω ∈ R.T h e n , Ψ(ω) is an externally stable set
and, moreover, there is a stable set K ⊇ Ψ(ω) whenever ω ∈ CKR.( 3 . 2 )
Suppose that X
Pi(ω) ⊆ Ψ(ω) for all i – i.e., every player knows “choice sets”.
Then, ω ∈ R iﬀ Ψ(ω) is a stable set. (3.3) Suppose that K is a self-evident
event satisfying K =
n
ω ∈ Ω| X
Pi(ω) ⊆ Ψ(ω)=K
o
.T h e n ,K ⊆ R ∩ CKR
whenever K is a stable set. (3.4) For any compact stable set K,t h e r ei sω ∈
R ∩ CKR such that Ψ(ω)=K.
Proof. (3.1) Let y ∈ X\Ψ(ω).S i n c e ω ∈ R, yi / ∈ BRi(ω) for some i.B y
P1 and Theorem 1, yi is strictly dominated given X
Pi(ω). By Lemma 5, there
exists x∗
i ∈ Xi such that (a) x∗
i strictly dominates yi given X
Pi(ω);a n d( b )x∗
i
is not strictly dominated given X

















i strictly dominates yi given Ψ(ω).T h e r e f o r e ,x Â
Ψ(ω) y for some x ∈ Ψ(ω).
Thus, Ψ(ω) is an externally stable set.
Now, let K≡X
R∩CKR
. By Theorem 2, K is a stable set. Since by CK1,
Pi(ω) ⊆ R ∩ CKR for all i, Ψ(ω) ⊆ K.
(3.2) First of all, since by A1 and A2, ×j∈NX
Pj(ω)
j ⊆ X
Pi(ω), Ψ(ω) ⊆ X
Pi(ω).
As X
Pi(ω) ⊆ Ψ(ω), Ψ(ω)=X
Pi(ω) ∀i.
“if part”: Suppose that Ψ(ω) is a stable set. By Lemma 6, x ∈ Ψ(ω) iﬀ,f o r
all i, xi is not strictly dominated given Ψ(ω).S i n c eΨ(ω)=X
Pi(ω),b yP1 and
Theorem 1, x ∈ Ψ(ω) iﬀ,f o ra l li, xi is a best response given Pi(ω).T h e r e f o r e ,
X
Pi(ω)
i = BRi(ω) for all i.T h a ti s ,ω ∈ R.
“only if part”: Suppose ω ∈ R.B y( 3 . 1 ) ,Ψ(ω) is externally stable. There-
fore, it remains to verify that Ψ(ω) is internally stable. Assume, in negation,
that y Â
Ψ(ω) x for some x,y ∈ Ψ(ω). Then, for some i, yi strictly dominates
xi given Ψ(ω).S i n c eΨ(ω)=X
Pi(ω),b yP1 and Theorem 1, xi is not a best
response given Pi(ω).S i n c eω ∈ Ri, xi / ∈ X
Pi(ω)
i .T h u s ,x/ ∈ Ψ(ω),w h i c hi sa
contradiction.
(3.3) Suppose that K is a stable set. Since X
Pi(ω) ⊆ Ψ(ω) for all ω ∈ K ,
by (3.2), K ⊆ R.S i n c eK is self-evident, by CK2, K ⊆ CKR.T h u s ,
K ⊆ R ∩ CKR.
(3.4) The proof is totally similar to the last part of Step 3 in the proof of
Theorem 2. We therefore omit it.
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